Evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: Simulation of a tripartite game model

Wang, Mingyue and Li, Yingming and Cheng, Zhixuan and Zhong, Chao and Ma, Wenjing (2021) Evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: Simulation of a tripartite game model. Journal of Cleaner Production, 278. p. 123944. ISSN 0959-6526

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123944

Abstract

Green technological innovation (GTI) is an important driving force to achieve high-quality development. In terms of system engineering, GTI is a process of multi-agent participation and dynamic evolution. To determine the evolution of a GTI system, an evolutionary game model composed of local governments, enterprises, and consumers is constructed. The evolutionary process and the influence of participants’ strategy choices on the system equilibrium are then analyzed, and an experimental simulation is carried out using the system dynamics method. The findings are as follows. (1) Of all the possible equilibrium strategies of the GTI evolution game system, only three are stable: market regulation by local government, non-GTI by enterprises, and consumers purchasing traditional products; market regulation by local government, GTI by enterprises, and consumers purchasing traditional products; and market deregulation, GTI by enterprises, and consumers purchasing green products. (2) The brand benefits of enterprises’ GTI and the economic income from consumers’ green product consumption are the main factors that influence the evolution of the game system to different stable equilibrium strategies. (3) Under the equilibrium state (1,1,1), the impact of the GTI system is more significant if enterprises are encouraged to adopt a GTI strategy and consumers are encouraged to choose a green product strategy. (4) Subsidy coefficient, market regulation intensity, and brand benefits of GTI of enterprise are the main factors influencing enterprises to adopt a GTI strategy, and each factor has a significant difference on the direction and marginal influence of the main players’ strategy choice. These findings provide a reference for further refinements to green development theory and for the construction of a market-oriented GTI system. © 2020 Elsevier Ltd

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Government market regulation; Enterprise GTI; Evolutionary game theory; System dynamics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions: Faculty of Economics & Administration
Depositing User: Ms. Juhaida Abd Rahim
Date Deposited: 05 May 2021 07:09
Last Modified: 05 May 2021 07:09
URI: http://eprints.um.edu.my/id/eprint/25948

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