Technology-sharing strategy and incentive mechanism for R&D teams of manufacturing enterprises

Zhang, Hao and Wang, Mingyue and Cheng, Zhixuan and Wan, Ling (2020) Technology-sharing strategy and incentive mechanism for R&D teams of manufacturing enterprises. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 555. p. 124546. ISSN 0378-4371

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2020.124546

Abstract

Technology innovation is a necessary condition for manufacturing enterprises to maintain competitiveness. As the central part of the national innovation system, enterprises must avoid redundant research and development (R&D) input and blind competition; therefore, it is crucial to guide technology-sharing of R&D teams in enterprises. An evolutionary game model for the analysis of agents’ strategy choice between upstream and downstream R&D teams is established. It shows that the technology-sharing strategy chosen by the R&D teams is closely related to the sharable coefficient of technology, and also closely related to the benefits obtained through free-riding. As the sharable coefficient of technology of upstream and downstream R&D teams A and B is continuously changing, four evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies appear in turn. The coefficient of synergy benefits, the capacity of technology absorption, and the sharable coefficient of technology have a positive correlation with the sum of direct benefits and synergy benefits; the technology transfer costs, the capability difference costs, risk factors, and the relative amount of technology-sharing are the critical factors negatively affecting the technology-sharing of the upstream and downstream R&D teams. A specific compensation mechanism can reduce the cost of sharing and increase the willingness to share technology. At the same time, as the internal incentive factors changes, the technology-sharing system tends to converge to {technology-sharing, technology-sharing}, thus providing decision support for the formulation and effective evaluation of manufacturing innovation policies. © 2020 Elsevier B.V.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Manufacturing enterprises; Technology-sharing; Evolutionary game; Incentive mechanism
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions: Faculty of Economics & Administration
Depositing User: Ms. Juhaida Abd Rahim
Date Deposited: 20 Jan 2021 06:46
Last Modified: 20 Jan 2021 06:46
URI: http://eprints.um.edu.my/id/eprint/25702

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