Effective corporate board structure and agency problems: Evidence from China’s economic transition

Zhang, C. and Cheong, K.C. and Rasiah, R. and Zhang, C. (2016) Effective corporate board structure and agency problems: Evidence from China’s economic transition. International Journal of China Studies, 7 (2). pp. 199-214. ISSN 2180-3250

Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: https://www.um.edu.my/docs/default-source/ics/ics-...

Abstract

This study investigates the determinants of Chinese board structure during the economic transition from the year 2000 to 2012. It uses principal component analysis with fixed effects estimation to test three hypotheses – the scope of operation hypothesis, monitoring hypothesis and bargaining hypothesis – using different subsamples. Explained without the use of mathematical rigor, the paper’s main findings are that Chinese stock market liberalization and the ultimate controlling shareholder are important factors when constituting board structure. After the split-share structure reform, China tends to have an outsider-dominated board structure. While private-controlled enterprises are more efficient in constituting board structure, CEOs of state-controlled enterprises have more bargaining power over board structure.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: China economic transition; Corporate governance; Board structure
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Divisions: Faculty of Economics & Administration
Depositing User: Ms. Juhaida Abd Rahim
Date Deposited: 15 May 2018 04:15
Last Modified: 15 May 2018 04:15
URI: http://eprints.um.edu.my/id/eprint/18672

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item