A METHODOICAL GAMUT APPROACH FOR ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF BDS CAMPAIGN AND PALESTINIAN HARMONY

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Abstract
This paper analysis and appraises the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel. First, it adumbrates the different conflicts with appearance and eminence of the BDS campaign. Then, it elucidates the BDS strategy, particularly the boycott. Next, the paper elaborate by recognized the campaign’s power and promise with relation to the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli politics. More unequivocally, the campaign is powerful because it is a networked contestation of the discursive rules that involve symmetry be posited between Palestinians and Israel.

Key Words: BDS, Discussion of Palestinian-Israeli politics, Networked contestation, Methodical
Boycott framework

The impact of international conflict on two-pronged trade relations using several incidents of politically motivated boycotts: The boycott of Danish commodities by Muslim countries following the Muhammad Comic Crisis in 2005/2006, the Chinese boycott of Japanese commodities in retort to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island conflict in 2012, the boycott of French products in the US over the Iraq War in 2003, and Turkey's boycott of Israel over the Gaza conflict in 2014. It has been estimated an average one-year trade commotion of 18.8% in the case of Denmark, 2.7% for Japan, and 1.7% for French (Heilmann, 2015). Trade policy has long been an established tool in relations between states. Trade agreements can strengthen inter-state relations and a large literature in political science had illustrated international trade's role in promoting peace and interstate cooperation (Barbieri, 2002; Gartzke, Li, & Boehmer, 2001; Li & Reuveny, 2011; Massoud & Magee, 2012). At the same time, international trade can be engaged as a policy means in the case of conflict through sanctions, impediments, and boycotts. Trade boycotts between countries are a fastidious shape of these policy tools. They have been employed throughout history to chastise or compel explicit behavior among trading partners. Examples of international conflicts where boycotts were employed encompass the repeated boycotts of Japan by China throughout the 1930s in response to the Japanese invasion (Lauterpacht, 1933).

The boycott of Israel by the Arab League after arrangement of the Jewish state in 1948, the worldwide boycott movement in protest of South Africa's apartheid system in the late 1950s, and the consumer boycott in antagonism to French products over nuclear testing in the 1990s. Most recently, the connotation of international trade boycotts has been highlighted by Russia's state-led import ban of agricultural products from Europe in result to sanctions over Russian infringement in neighboring Ukraine (Heilmann, 2015). These events share the common aspect that they are not motivated by economic underlying principle, such as inferior product quality, but rather by political events and thus let us to learn about how shocks to international relations affect trade. In difference to the more recurrent boycotts against specific firms, such as the boycott against Shell in 1995, they are directed against whole countries. They appear to become an option when other means of intimidation, such as war or the severing of diplomatic relationships materialize to be infeasible.
The latter boycotts of the 21st century appear to be a simple extension of earlier practices, but several developments signify an increase in the importance of boycotts as policy tools and warrant further research. In a world characterized by less violence and dwindling tolerance for militarized conflict between states, trade policy is the customary tool to carry out international disputes (Pinker, 2011). In addition, international trade has drag over the past decades, making boycotts potentially more detrimental to trading partners. This is especially true since the attribute of trade has changed from a simple exchange in final goods to a system of international production sharing. The arrival of the internet has also changed international relations and the implication of governments. Being able to contrary and harmonize their actions online, consumer boycotts enable the public to become a political agent in international relations. In the case of the Chinese consumer boycott against Japan in 2012, the internet may have played a critical role in organizing the boycott, with the Chinese government having limited control over the reaction on the streets.

This haul questions on how governments and the masses interact when it comes to foreign relations and how sundry regime types support the emergence of consumer boycotts (Weiss, 2013, 2014). A crucial question is whether these new types of boycotts are effective. Aside from a decline in import demand, international conflicts might blight trade by putting business partners at personal risk when traveling, through latent government intervention or even through the boycotted country's defiance to export in response to the aggression. Similarly, boycotts can be unsuccessful in many extents. At first, if the boycotted country's exporters can simply redirect their sales to domestic or other foreign markets, the imminent economic loss may be small. Through studying consumer boycotts and their instinctive small-agent problem, i.e. the success of the boycott depends on a mass of participants. In their study find a significant drop in sales of US soft drinks in the Middle East. Results from the multi-country Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) Comic boycott, where countries with higher press liberty boycott more, signifying that consumers find it easier to organize and participate in boycotts in open regimes (Clerides, Davis, & Michis, 2015).
Muhammad cartoon calamity
On September 30, 2005 the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published a string of cartoons showing Islamic prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) in an unfavorable manner. Not only is the demonstration of the prophet (P.B.U.H) forbidden in numerous branches of Islam, but Muslims felt that the comics connect them to terrorists, thus the comics had a religious as well as political dimension. Even though Danish Muslims protested the publication from the very start, it was not until early 2006 that the controversy became international after the comics had been reprinted in Arabic newspapers. Violent protests winked in many Middle Eastern countries, leading the ambassadors of numerous Muslim countries to unsuccessfully demand an official apology by the Danish government and prosecution of the cartoon artists. The months of January and February 2006 saw added rise of the conflict with Western embassies being attacked in Damascus, Beirut, and Tehran, leaving numerous dozen people dead. With the Danish government refusing an official apology, religious leaders in Saudi Arabia called for a boycott of Danish goods on January 26, 2006, publishing a boycott list of Danish firms (Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2015). Soon, other Muslim countries coupled the boycott. The French supermarket chain Carrefour preemptively disconnected Danish goods from its shelves in the Middle East and several Danish food producers, such as Arla Foods, reported large losses (Ashenfelter, Ciccarella, & Shatz, 2007). The scandal about the Muhammad (P.B.U.H) cartoons at the end lost public attentiveness and the protests calmed down, though various incidents in later years were associated to the cartoons, e.g. the 2008 and 2010 attempts to assassinate the maker of the most controversial of the cartoons which could be prevented by police (Heilmann, 2015).

Turkey's embargo of Israel
On July 8th 2014, the long-lasting conflict between Israel and the Palestinians lifted again when Israeli military began airstrikes on Gaza after profound shelling of Israeli territory by Hamas. Two weeks later, the Israeli Defense Force led a ground invasion into the Gaza strip which resulted in the death of more than 2000 Palestinians, approximately 1500 of them being civilians. Public protest over the humanitarian toll of the conflict flickered anti-Israel protests in Turkey with Turkish prime minister connect Israel's actions to genocide. The Turkish trade union TESK initiated a boycott call against Israel in late July (Heilmann, 2015). In this echelon, under the light and paradigm of different boycotts we’ll analyze BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) movement, its strategy and effectiveness.
BDS connotation
BDS means boycott, divestment, and sanctions, and pass on to three diverse yet related forms of corrective action against Israel. All of these actions support isolating, breaking off relationships with, delegitimizing Israel (Diker, 2015).

Boycott
It refers to the encroachment of relationships with Israel as a means of protest and/or pressure. These actions encompass of consumer and trade boycotts, cultural and sporting boycotts, and academic boycotts.

Divestment
It is the converse of investment: the withdrawal of investments in Israel by banks, pension funds, and other large investors or from companies working in Israel.

Sanctions
It refers to curative actions taken by governments and international organizations, including trade penalties or bans, arms impediments, and cutting off diplomatic relations.

Boycotting Israel: history and agenda
Discussions of an inclusive boycott of Israel are a contemporary phenomenon within civil society in Europe, North America and Asia. However, connected discussions have taken place in the Middle East since Israel’s inception in 1948. In situating the reverberation of the current BDS movement in the West and Asia, it is handy to deem the changed historical perspective and the idiosyncratic elements that place the current debates in the context of international solidarity and counter hegemonic discourse. In 1948, a call for boycott of the state of Israel was initiated by the League of Arab States (hereafter the Arab League). Three major inter-reliant features characterized the Arab League boycott:

1. Its constant lack of ability effectively to publicize the human (and human rights) aspect of the Palestinian plight after 1948, primarily in countries of the industrialized West;
2. Its statist, rather than popular, aspect which obscured how boycotts may be a shape of peaceful struggle to colonialism and racism; and
3. Its regional, rather than international, characteristic. The year 1948 signals an important starting point for illustrating these features, through re-consideration of the contested historiography of Israel-Palestine, as well as the contested nature of international boycotts in
retort to this conflict zone (A. B. Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009). In Israeli terminology, the events of 1948, leading up to the formation of the state of Israel, are referred to as a war of independence from the British (in Hebrew Azma'ut) or liberation from the Diaspora (Shihrrur). As Ilan Pappe notes, neither of these provisions provide any explicit reference to the indigenous Arab population. Notably, it is particularly the experiences of this population that, since the 1980s, have formed the backbone of a revisionist ‘post-Zionist’ history that has challenged the assumptions underlying the prevailing Israeli national narrative (Pappe, 2004). This revisionist history is significant in considering how the human face of the Palestinians is central to today’s BDS movement. It should be noted, however, that the center rudiments of the revisionist history communicate with the longstanding Palestinian national narrative. This views the year 1948 as a catastrophe (in Arabic Al-Nakba) epitomized by half of the Arab population losing homes and property and becoming stateless refugees outside and inside historic Palestine. Ronit Lentin enclosed this contested topography of memory in the perspective of a challenge to the Israeli state’s ‘active memoricide of both the Nakba and the ethnically rinsed Palestinians’ (Lentin, 2008). Abu-Lughod and Sa’di wrote about Nakba:

It is the focal point for what might be called Palestinian time. The Nakba is the pinnacle of reference for other events, past and future. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 increased its connotation from being followed by the Nakba. Landmark proceedings in Palestinian history such as Black September (Jordan, 1970), the massacre at Sabra and Shatila (Lebanon, 1982), Land Day (Israel, 1976) and the first and second intifadas (1987–93, 2000–present) would not have emerged if they had not been lead by the Nakba to which they refer back. The Nakba has become a key event in the Palestinian calendar – the baseline for personal histories and the classification of generations (Sa'di & Abu-Lughod, 2007). An additional attribute of the Palestinian narrative is the indulgent that in its European roots and, in its concomitant erasure and radicalization of the indigenous Arab population, the Israeli state was an outgrowth of settler colonization. Thus Zionism is a dogma which has supported the practices of Israel as a colonist state and is not synonymous with Judaism (A. B. Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009). Put it another way, there is no equation between being Jewish – a religious or cultural identity – and being Zionist – a political standpoint that views an utterly ‘Jewish’ state as the only effectual cure to a perceived universalized anti-Semitism (A. B. Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009). Elsewhere we have extended on Charles Mills’ concept of the racial contract to the international arena, to elucidate the role of major powers both outside and through the United Nations in transmitting widespread interest between the state of Israel and international political allies.
The racial contract has served to render the state of Israel as outstanding in its relationship to international law, while absenting Palestinians as concurrently non-white, the subjects of extreme repression and stateless. Employing Gramsci’s indulgent of hegemony is useful in this agenda, acknowledging how this racial contract, like the capitalist system itself, is never dormant, but grounded in contradictory forces and subject to challenge. Prior to 1948, when Palestine was under the British mandate, Palestinian Arabs uttered a form of resistance to escalating numbers of settlers by boycotting Zionist businesses and goods (Sigall & Chill, 1977). This type of consumer-driven boycott may be seen to have current parallels. For example, the application of anti-consumerist activism, predominantly in advanced capitalist countries, is a crucial component of the transnational popular opposition to neoliberal globalization and expedition for global justice that marked the first period of the new millennium (Littler, 2005). Links with the Palestinian struggle to occupation and war have been an imperative element of theorizations of the movement for global justice since the Seattle protests against the neoliberal policies of the World Trade Organization marked the turn of the new millennium (A. Bakan, 2000). Not staggeringly, antiglobalization theorists such as Naomi Klein, noted above, have readily challenged Israel’s links with corporate capitalism and have support movements for boycott that seek out substitute economic outlets (McGuigan, 2010). As J. B. Spector points out, modern proponents of boycotts have drawn on an understanding of political action that blends aspects of western and eastern political and religious beliefs:

Since the 20th century, boycotts have integrated international coalitions of states acting upon nonstate actors to influence yet another state; non-state actors looking for to persuade a group of states to act to endorse change in the internal policies of yet another state; and efforts by coalitions of international non state actors (sometimes with the assistance of individual states or international organizations) to bring pressure to bear on the government of a particular state (Sidiropoulos, Draper, Mills, & Khumalo, 2004). Significantly, the current movement combines calls for boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel, the latter portentous calls for state action in amalgamation with those at the level of civil society. The role of the United States (and allies in the United Nations) in intimidating extensive sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq after the 1990 assault of Kuwait is another case in point. While Iraq practiced one of the most inclusive boycotts in history, other countries have also been a focus for the US (for example, Iran, Libya and Sudan), (O’Sullivan, 2003).
Beginning in 1948, a midway in which opposition continued to be registered regarding the violent origins of the Israeli state – and the substantial predicament of the Palestinians – was through the Arab League’s boycott against Israeli companies and Israeli-made goods. Since the 2000s, the BDS movement has integrated South African spokespersons (for example, Desmond Tutu), (Tutu, 2002). The new movement has found reverberation in civil society organizations that have emerged in the perspective of a renewed period of anti-neoliberalism and opposition to US militarism linked with the Iraq war, primarily based on the analogy with South Africa. The verity that the BDS movement is also coupled with a new generation of Palestinian and other Arab activists in the diaspora is significant (Ziadah, 2008). The BDS movement has appeared in the post-9/11 climate in which fright, racial profiling and internment of Arabs and/or Muslims has become more prominent, but has also been countered by a global movement against war and racism (Abu-Laban, 2004). Certainly, according to Gargi Bhattacharyya, ‘support for Palestinian human rights has become the symbolic harmony movement of our time’ (Bhattacharyya, 2008). Recent events surrounding Israel’s war on Gaza have leant auxiliary credence to this observation.

The modern BDS movement is nonhierarchical and has made use of new forms of communication – including international e-mail networks, blogs and web-based journalism – to give information that translates willingly from Arabic to English and other languages and to support harmonized mobilization (Di Stefano & Henaway, 2014). For example, since 2001 the nuance of the online publication Electronic Intifada has been enormous in providing information and analysis from a Palestinian perspective. Whatever limits of an overarching concept of ‘global civil society’, this kind of communication has sustained and facilitated changes in strategies of resistance and solidarity (Bellingham et al.).

**BDS call and Palestinian harmonized society**

The contemporary movement comprises a number of instigated moments, but the most widespread call for a global campaign for boycott, divestment and sanctions was launched in July 2005, by 170 civil society organizations within Palestine itself. Civil society here means non-state organizations, with trade unions, faith-based communities, student organizations, social movement organizations and political parties. The attainment of a united response among Palestinian organizations challenged divisions that had developed, primarily since Oslo, and pointed to a strategy of non-violence and international solidarity inspired by the successful conversion from apartheid South Africa. The call-out is in straight response to Israel’s persistent violation of international law. It is structured to give a foundation of unity that can combine largely dispersed organizations and forces (Di Stefano & Henaway, 2014).
The combined call is based on three demands grounded in basic principles of human rights widely recognized in international human rights practices and discourse: In light of Israel’s invariable violations of international law, and Given that, since 1948, hundreds of UN resolutions have ordained Israel’s colonial and discriminatory policies as illegal and called for immediate, adequate and effective remedies, and Given that all types of international intrusion and peace-making have until now failed to provoke or force Israel to conform with humanitarian law, to respect fundamental human rights and to end its occupation and oppression of the people of Palestine, and in view of the fact that people of conscience in the international community have historically established the moral responsibility to fight injustice, as exemplified in the struggle to eliminate apartheid in South Africa through sundry forms of boycott, divestment and sanctions; Inspired by the struggle of South Africans against apartheid and in the spirit of international solidarity, moral faithfulness and resistance to injustice and repression, representatives of Palestinian civil society, call upon international civil society organizations and people of conscience all over the world to exact broad boycotts and employ divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era. BDS campaign appeal to you to demand your particular states to induce embargoes and sanctions against Israel. We also incite conscientious Israelis to support this Call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace. These non-violent disciplinary measures should be sustained until Israel meets its responsibility to recognize the Palestinian people’s absolute right to self determination and fully complies with the principle of international law by:

1. Ending its coercive occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and take apart the Wall;
2. Acknowledge the primary rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full parity; and
3. Respecting, protecting and enforce the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as predetermined in UN resolution 194 (Morrison, 2015a).

The prevalent call for boycott, divestment and sanctions emerged as a retort to the ICJ ruling, the UN endorsement and Israel’s subsequent overt refusal to comply while not facing any consequences in its international stature (Usher, 2006). The BDS call is idiosyncratic in its lucidity and amalgamated base of support within Palestinian society. It was headed by the venerable calls for boycott from Arab states referred to above, as well as a call for economic, cultural and academic boycott of Israel in 2002 (Storey, 2005). It had been followed by an analogous call from Palestinian filmmakers, artists and cultural workers and a wide coalition of Palestinian labor federations, vocational and professional trade unions (A. B. Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009).
However, it is also distinguishing in the reverberation it has met among civil society groups in Europe and North America. For example, award-winning British filmmaker Ken Loach issued a public statement in August 2006 in which he assured support for the boycott called for by Palestinian film-makers and artists and stated that he would refute an invitation to present one of his films at the Haifa Film Festival ‘or other such occasions’ (Barghouti, 2011).

**BDS campaign stratagem**

Associating the conditions of Palestinians directly with churches, student organizations, trade unions, municipalities and social movements, the BDS strategy is planned not only to endorse economic consequences for Israel’s economy, but also, and often deemed more prominently, to dislodge hegemonic discourse that Israel is a progressive state. The stated goals of the campaign are predominantly grounded in education and building an international culture that supports Palestinian human rights:

The major goals of this call are:
- To divulge to the world the nature of Israel’s occupation and apartheid regime;
- To give human rights an actual value by making Israel answerable and forcing it to pay a price for its crimes;
- To disclose and highlight the duty of the international community in supporting Israeli crimes and infringements of human rights and international law; and

Above all, to end international support for Israeli occupation and apartheid since these cannot carry on without external support (Abu-Laban & Bakan, 2012). The campaign is intended to be agile in its application and adaptable to specific conditions in diverse international, regional and local contexts. Persistently, however, the place of Zionism as a hegemonic constituent in western ideology has been challenged and debates regarding the disposition of racism and anti-racism have inevitably ensued. In spite of facing strong lobbying and opposition to anecdotal degrees among organized Zionist interests, the BDS campaign has sustained to grow. Labor actions integrated historic acts of solidarity. Dockworkers in Durban, South Africa, for example, members of the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU), refused to offload an Israeli ship in anticipation of its arrival on 8 February 2009. In Norway, the Locomotive Drivers Union on 8 January saw all trains, trams and subways come to a close down in a two-minute protest, during which time an assertion demanding ‘the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli troops from Palestinian territory’ was read to all passengers (Morrison, 2015b).
New and louder voices in support of boycotting Israel also embrace considerable challenges to the conventional Zionist organizations among the international Jewish community. The close acknowledgment of this campaign with the global movement for social justice was specified at the 100,000 strong meeting of the World Social Forum (WSF) in Belém, Brazil. The WSF made a statement in favor of the BDS campaign and further called for an international day of action on 30 March 2009 (Becker, 2009). The increasing influence of the movement among students, labor and human rights activists in light of the war on Gaza is analytical of its combined strategic and educational capacity. In framing Israel as an apartheid state, the BDS campaign has added to an anti-racist defy to the Orientalist and Islamophobic messaging linked with the George Bush era and the war on terror (Massad, 2006; Said, 2015). However, at the nucleus of the effectiveness of the BDS campaign strategy, and the fundamental subaltern factor in its counter-hegemonic force, is the unity of purpose that it reflects within Palestine itself. After decades of disappointment and crumbling in the aftermath of the failed Oslo accords, the BDS movement has united Palestinians transversely borders, political factions and generations. It has brought transformed attention to Israel’s invariable violations of international law, including the construction of the ‘apartheid wall’, the negation of civil rights of Palestinian Israelis and the denial of the right of return of Palestinian refugees (Barghouti, 2012).

The dormant effectiveness of the BDS movement may be established in part by the reactive response of the hegemonic bloc it challenges, including the Israeli state. Israel’s refutation to adhere to international law overlaps with its public image as a ‘democracy’ challenged by ‘terrorists’. Its defensive posture is indicated in its unprecedented ‘rebranding campaign’ in cities around the world. This campaign looks for to market Israel as an attractive locale for tourism and investment and change the image of Israel as an antagonist state. The rebranding efforts can be expected to carry on in the aftermath of the carnage revealed during the war on Gaza (Benn, 2009). The current conjecture then is one in which an historic hegemony, where Zionism has been included in an international racial contract, is under stern challenge through the resistance from Palestinian civil society. There is, in this perspective, deepening reverberation to the counterhegemonic argument that views Israel as a state that should be isolated internationally through boycott, divestment and sanctions until it reverses its racist violations of international law and human rights. In dissimilarity to the failure of the United Nations successfully to sanction the Israeli state’s impudence of international law, what could be seen as a ‘United Nations from below’ has taken the responsibility.
The BDS movement is one that international solidarity activists and anti-racist social theorists can and should fruitfully clasp and advance, regardless of the laden atmosphere of debate and challenges. In fact, these challenges can be understood as an unavoidable attribute of an ongoing dislodgement of an historic hegemonic discourse. The BDS strategic movement is showing all the signs of a current that can cultivate significantly and can provide as an important step in forging global solidarity against racism, colonialism and oppression.

**Israel boycott from the realm of academia**

In 2005, one year after the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion affirming Israel’s wall in the West Bank illegal under international humanitarian law, a large sector of Palestinian civil society issued a call for an international boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel “until Palestinian rights are accepted in full compliance with international law.” More than one hundred seventy Palestinian civil society organizations, trade unions, rights movements, and political parties both in the diaspora and within the borders of historic Palestine legitimate the call. The boycott of Israeli cultural and academic institutions, which are seen as fundamental “to maintaining, defending, or whitewashing the tyranny of Palestinians,” is one facet of the larger BDS movement that has garnered much attention, becoming the object of heated controversy in the United States. BDS supporters observe the ethical deportment of the academic boycott as a crucial part of the larger movement as well as a symbolic advance in the sphere of public discourse; opponents believe the boycott an attack on the legitimacy of the Israeli state and a threat to academic freedom and cultural dialogue (Mullen, 2015). The movement for academic boycott obtained considerable concentration as a result of an initiative from British university and college lecturers for extending an educational campaign. This was met with substantial backlash, reverberating among Canadian universities, but not in a manner that served to stall impetus for discussion of the implications of academic boycott in either the UK or Canada. Presently, transformed initiatives to pursue the insinuations of academic boycott are under meditation among the University and College Union lecturers in Britain (Aboud, Choudry, Hanley, & Shragge, 2012). In the United States, the prestigious Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts, turned out to be the first of any postsecondary institution in the country ‘to divest from companies on the grounds of their connection in the Israeli occupation of Palestine (Erakat, 2012).
However, the reach of the BDS call has been much wider, corroboration by its implication during and after the 2008–9 war on Gaza. A few examples imply the speed and breadth of the appeal. University students in the UK, in a wave of protests considered equivalent to the events of the 1960s, were impelled to demand, among other issues and often successfully, that their universities divest funds from Israeli institutions (Dugan, 2009).

Conclusion
The BDS campaign has pooled a number of successes and come to exercise significant power in a relatively short period of time. Despite of its contradictions, the campaign’s strategy of boycotts, divestment and sanctions open, for Palestinians and supporters of their rights and international law, innumerable new and varied points of political struggle. They make every university senate meeting, pension fund investment decision, shareholders’ meeting, purchase and film screening an imminent opportunity to challenge the extant discourse of Palestinian-Israeli politics. The campaign rendered nodes of contestation and give each of them another prospect to educate and organize for Palestinian rights and international law on a global scale.

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